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We report a new method for Experimenting over a Long Distance (ELD)
allowing to simultaneously run decentralized interactive experiments in
geographically separated subject pools. Applying ELD to an intercultural
trust experiment with participants from Argentina, China and Germany
we found a striking evidence for transcontinental trust behavior. In
addition to Chinese senders’ discrimination of Argentinean players no
discrimination in trust and reciprocity behavior was observed. Neverthe-
less, we found signiﬁcantly diﬀerent levels of trust and reciprocity in the
diﬀerent national cultures.
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acknowledged.1 Introduction and motivation
When planning interactive experiments with geographically or administratively
separated subject pools researchers face large logistic, ﬁnancial and technical
problems. These are incompatibility of computer equipment and software (if
computers are available at all), high travelling expenses and communication costs,
impeded or lacking accessibility of certain subject pools. As a consequence, sub-
ject pool selection might be biased towards populations where experimentation
facilities are readily available. This causes the neglect of those subjects that are
not easily accessible.
Globalization, however, does lead to interaction also between populations where
western technical standards are often not met. Therefore, a method is needed
allowing for incorporating subject pools that are technically diﬃcult to access.
This method should enable easy-to-run interactive experiments in a real inter-
national and intercultural setting 1 leading to better mutual understanding and
advice for practical work.
Individuals hold diﬀerent country-speciﬁc or culture-speciﬁc dispositions that,
along with their perception of other cultures, inﬂuence their behavior in inter-
cultural decisions (Hofstede 2001). Most experimental studies comparing behav-
iour in diﬀerent cultures are cross-cultural investigations 2. Almost no studies
involve true inter-cultural experiments (see however Boarini et al. 2002, Born-
horst et al. 20043).
To overcome the deﬁciencies mentioned above we developed a new method for Ex-
perimenting over a Long Distance (abbreviated ELD in the following) that allows
to simultaneously running decentralized interactive experiments in geographically
1In the following we deﬁne experiments as intra-cultural experiments if behavior within
one culture is compared. Cross-cultural experiments are those where behavior in two or more
cultures is compared with no direct interaction of subjects belonging to diﬀerent cultures. Inter-
cultural comparisons investigate behaviour of subjects in diﬀerent cultures interacting directly
with each other.
2See for instance Willinger et al. 2003, Hennig-Schmidt et al. 2002, Anderson et al. 2000,
Henrich et al. 2001, Roth et al. 1991, see also the survey by Oosterbeek et al. 2004.
3The subject pool of this experiment consists of PhD. students all located at the European
University Institute (EUI) in Florence.
1separated subject pools and to standardize procedure protocols. ELD minimizes
logistic eﬀort, technical requirements and travel expenditures. It is particularly
suited for simple games. We apply ELD to an adapted version of the invest-
ment/trust game (Berg et al. 1995) with participants from Argentina, China and
Germany. We refer to this game when explaining ELD in the following.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the features of
the ELD-method in detail. In section 3, we brieﬂy report results. Section 4
discusses the method and concludes.
2 The ELD - Method
In separated subject pools, non-interactive one-shot single-player experiments as
well as one-stage multi-player experiments can experimentally easily be handled
because subjects do no actually interact. Organizational problems arise, however,
in multi-person multi-stage designs where participants have to take sequential de-
cisions under time restrictions imposed by time zones and disposable resources
and at diﬀerent locations. The crucial constraint in these experiments is the in-
terdependence of consecutive decisions: One subject’s choice depends on a prior
decision of another person. ELD is designed to overcome this restriction by re-
moving decision interdependence without creating incentive biases.
The usual sequential protocol for running investment game experiments is as
follows. First, a sender and a responder get an endowment X. The sender has
the opportunity to invest any integer aǫ[0,1,...,X−1,X] that is transferred to an
anonymously matched responder. Each possible amount a chosen by the sender
is tripled by the experimenter, thus the responder gets 3a for each a. Then the
responder freely decides to transfer any integer bǫ[0,1,...,3a − 1,3a] back to the
sender. Being dependent on the ﬁrst mover’s action, the second mover can not
make her decision without receiving information on the ﬁrst mover’s choice. We
solve the problem of sequential interdependence by applying the following fea-
tures.
21. Strategy method (Selten 1967): This method allows to organizationally dis-
connect the second stage of the game from the ﬁrst stage. By having the second
mover indicate her choices for all possible ﬁrst mover’s decisions, the sequential
two-person two-stage game is converted into a two-person normal-form one-stage
game for each subject. These correlated games can be played independently at
diﬀerent locations and diﬀerent points in time.
2. Pen-and-paper: By using pen and paper, the experimental design becomes in-
dependent of compatible equipment and software, reducing start-up costs. More-
over, experiments can be run in non-lab environments like classrooms. Procedures
are more transparent and thus may be perceived as more credible by the partici-
pants.
3. Remote-control organization: When applying ELD, a central unit, the Chief
Experimenter (CE) is responsible for overall planning and controlling of the inter-
cultural experiment. Local experimenters (LEs) are in charge of organizing and
running the sessions at the diﬀerent locations (see ﬁgure 1)4 CE briefs LEs in
advance by a detailed procedural script and an extensive instruction manual to
ensure equivalent experimental conditions in all locations involved. He prepares
instructions and decision sheets that are identical up to translation into the re-
spective languages being shipped to the corresponding LEs. Before running the
experiment, CE has to be provided with information on each participant necessary
to ex-ante code and prepare the decision sheets and to match players randomly
across subject pools. At each location, participants randomly draw an ex-ante
coded decision sheet before the experiment starts. Players are informed about
their counterpart’s pool aﬃliation. According to research interests, information
on additional characteristics and variables is provided. After all sessions in all
locations having been ﬁnished, CE collects all relevant information, computes all
payoﬀs and transfers this information to all LEs.
4We prefer to work with local experimenters to avoid self presentation eﬀects (face saving)
which are likely with inexperienced subjects, especially in Asia (Bond and Hwang, 1995).
3Figure 1: Schematic outline of ELD for the investment game with three subject pools
Figure 1 gives a schematic outline of the required steps when ELD is applied
to three subject pools. Possible intra-cultural assignment is not shown (see point
(ii) below).
Besides organizational requirements other methodological aspects are important:
(i) To ensure equivalence of instructions, they have to be translated into the
languages of the participating locations using the back-translation method (Bris-
lin 1970). It is advisable for the CE to run a series of pilot experiments with
subjects stemming from the subject pools involved. This not only ensures equiv-
alence of the instructions but also that participants fully understand all features
of the experiment.
(ii) Inter-cultural comparison requires an intra-cultural control with at least two
intra-cultural sub-pools to enable distinction between intra- and inter-cultural
behavioral variations. Subjects may not only behave diﬀerently towards counter-
parts from various countries/cultures. They may also diﬀerentiate towards sub-
ject pool members within their own country/culture (c.f. Fershtman and Gneezy
2001).
4(iii) Each subject’s minimum number of decisions equals the number of partici-
pating subject pools when intra-personal comparison in desired. When diﬀerent
player types exist and each subject has to decide in the role of all player types,
the number of each player’s decisions equals the number of subject pools times
the number of player types.
(iv) For each choice, a subject has to be provided with a decision sheet separately
accessible in order to prevent him from changing prior decisions or recouping
information from previous choices.
3 Application to an intercultural trust game
Procedure
We applied ELD to a trilateral inter-cultural trust study with student partici-
pants from Argentina (Universidad Nacional de La Plata; Universidad Nacional
de Tucum´ an), PR China (University of Finance and Economics; Tongji University,
both Shanghai) and Germany (Humboldt University, Berlin; Medical University,
L¨ ubeck). 90 subjects participated; 15 per sub-pool. We used design features 1
to 3 and speciﬁcations i-iv of section 2. We modiﬁed the trust game design by
doubling rather than tripling the amount a transferred by the sender. Moreover,
senders were endowed with an amount X whereas receivers got no endowment.
Experiments were divided into two parts, consisting of three decision rounds each.
Before starting the experiment, a subject was randomly assigned to a player type
- sender or receiver - by drawing a prepared decision sheet. This assignment was
kept throughout the ﬁrst part of the experiment consisting of three rounds. Each
sender (receiver) was randomly matched with a receiver (sender) of the other
intra-cultural sub-pool and with a receiver of one of the sub-pools in each of the
other two countries. In the second part of the experiment, players changed types,
the decision and assignment procedure being identical to the ﬁrst part. This was
made explicit before the experiment started. The experimental protocol guar-
anteed each player’s interaction with a counterpart from Argentina, China and
Germany in each part of the experiment only once and in a randomized order.
Ex-ante matching was done before the decision sheets were mailed to the local
experimenters.
5To get more data we decided to have subjects play in both roles, i.e. as senders
and as receivers. This was made common knowledge at the beginning of the
experiment. Thus every subject faced the same conditions.
To signal the counterpart’s cultural aﬃliation and to avoid a direct demand ef-
fect, a participant was informed on the counterpart’s family name and the uni-
versity’s oﬃcial name. In each round, senders received an endowment X=10ECU
(1ECU=2USD). The experiment was run in September 2002. Participants on
average earned 8.70 USD in Argentina, 10.08 USD in Germany, and 9.26 USD in
China.
Results
We ﬁrst look at trust behavior, i.e. the amount a transferred to the receivers.
Our data reveal that in the anonymous inter-cultural one-shot situation of our
experiment, individuals substantially deviate from the sub-game perfect equilib-
rium of no transfers by showing trust even across borders. 86% of German and
100% of Argentinean and Chinese senders transferred a positive amount a to
the assigned responder. This is remarkable given that subjects did not receive
additional information on their assigned players’ individual characteristics or pre-
vious behavior. Trust behavior is weakly signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across countries
(p=0.069, Kruskal Wallis test). Argentineans show the highest average trust level
(a=6.00, sd=1.74), followed by Chinese (a=5.43, sd=2.36) and Germans (a=5.36,
sd=3.26), see ﬁgure 2(a) and table 1.
Figure 2 a,b: Average senders’ trust per country (a) and towards country (b)
6Table 1: Average trust behavior (amount a transferred by the sender) and reciprocity behavior
(amount b transferred back by the responder as a percentage of 2a)
Although Germans show the lowest average trust, they do not discriminate be-
tween matched players’ origin. Argentineans also do not discriminate in trust.
Yet they are strongly discriminated by Chinese.
Trust towards countries is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent as well (p=0.008, Friedman test).
Chinese students are trusted most (a=5.83, sd=2.63) followed by Germans (a=5.79,
sd=2.49). Argentineans received the lowest transfers (a=5.17, sd=2.46), see table
1 and ﬁgure 2(b).
We now turn to reciprocity behavior, i.e. the amount b transferred back to the
senders. Reciprocity behavior turns out to be highly signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across
countries (p=0.000, Kruskal Wallis test). Germans show a signiﬁcantly lower av-
erage reciprocity level (36.14% of the received amount 2a are transferred back
to the sender, sd=22.35) than Argentineans (51.84%, sd=20.02) and Chinese
(48.82%, sd=23.22). Argentineans and Chinese on average transfer half of the
surplus back, with b≈2a/2. Germans, however, tend to equally distribute the
total joint proﬁt with b = 1/2[(X − a) + 2a], see ﬁgure 3.
No country was signiﬁcantly discriminated by other countries’ participants con-
cerning reciprocity behavior.
7Figure 3: Average responders’ back-transfer strategies
German participants received the highest total payoﬀ because of the facts that (i)
Germans made the lowest own transfers a whereas Argentinean and Chinese sub-
jects showed signiﬁcantly higher reciprocity levels, (ii) Argentineans and Chinese
players showed high trust behavior and Germans made the lowest back transfers b.
For a detailed evaluation of the experiment see Walkowitz (2005).
4 Discussion and conclusion
ELD proved to be a powerful method for running interactive inter-cultural ex-
periments and standardizing procedure protocols. It allows to combine intra-
cultural and inter-cultural research by having subjects actually interact with each
other. ELD can be applied to any number of subject pools and participants. No
computer-equipped laboratory is needed. Sessions are decentralized. They do not
have to be run strictly simultaneously thus avoiding time constraints. Initiation
costs are low, decisions sheets being shipped by mail.
ELD’s potential drawbacks should not be neglected either. ELD can best be
applied to simple experiments with few decision stages. When a large number of
subject pools is involved the resulting high number of choices might cause spill-
over eﬀects in that early decisions inﬂuence later choices. The pen-and-paper
method does not permit computerized data collection and thus is prone to calcu-
lation and matching errors. The strategy method may induce diﬀerent behavior
as compared to subjects who are confronted with actual choices (see, however,
Brandts and Charness 2000). Furthermore, the decision protocol may be rather
complex to some subjects who are not accustomed to take part in experiments.
8The strategy method, on the other hand, makes subjects think about every pos-
sible choice and the implications thereof. For this reason, we believe the data we
have been retrieving are based on intensive reasoning. Having subjects play in
both roles might also inﬂuence behavior5.
Given our research agenda, and weighing pros and cons, we consider ELD an
important research method especially when other methods are inapplicable or
particularly costly.
Applying ELD enabled us to run an inter-cultural trust experiment. We found
a striking evidence for transcontinental trust behavior even though players were
not provided with additional information about assigned players’ individual char-
acteristics. In addition to Chinese senders’ discrimination of Argentinean players
no discrimination in trust and reciprocity behavior was observed. Nevertheless,
we found signiﬁcantly diﬀerent levels of trust and reciprocity in the diﬀerent na-
tional cultures. This heterogeneity in the manifestation of social mechanisms
might cause serious frictions and misunderstandings in direct intercultural ex-
change. More experiments on behavior in actual interchange are required to
support our ﬁndings and to assess the impact for cross-cultural relationships.
This is an important agenda for future research.
References
[1] Anderson, L. R., Y. V. Rodgers, and R. R. Rodriguez (2000): Cultural
diﬀerences in attitudes toward bargaining, Economics Letters 69(1), 45-54.
[2] Berg, J., J. Dickhaut, and K. McCabe (1995): Trust, reciprocity, and social
history, Games and Economic Behavior, 10(1), 122-142.
[3] Boarini, R., J.-F. Laslier, and S. Robin (2002): Interpersonal comparison
of utility in bargaining: Evidence from a transcontinental ultimatum game,
Working Paper, Laboratoire d‘Econom´ etrie de l‘Ecole Polytechnique, Paris.
5Burks et al. (2003) found support for their reduced responsibility-hypothesis saying that
subjects who play in both roles show less trust and reciprocity.
9[4] Bond, M. H. and K. Hwang (1995): The social psychology of the Chinese
people, in M. H. Bond (Ed.): The social psychology of the Chinese people,
Hong Kong, Oxford University Press 1995.
[5] Bornhorst, F., A. Ichino, K. Schlag, and E. Winter (2004): Trust and trust-
worthiness among Europeans South - North Comparison, CEPR Discussion
Paper No. 4378.
[6] Brandts, J., and G. Charness (2000): Hot vs. cold Sequential responses and
preference stability in experimental games, Experimental Economics 2(3),
227-238.
[7] Brislin, R. W. (1970): Back-translation for cross-cultural research, Journal
of Cross-cultural Psychology 1, 185-216.
[8] Burks, S. V., J. P. Carpenter, and E. Verhoogen (2003): Playing both roles
in the trust game,Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 51, 195-
216.
[9] Fershtman, C. and U. Gneezy (2001): Discrimination in a segmented society
- An experimental approach, Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(1), 351-
371.
[10] Hennig-Schmidt, H., Zh. Li and Ch. Yang (2002): Does power inﬂuence
bargaining outcomes? A video experimental study in Germany and the
People’s Republic of China, in Conference Proceedings of XXVII. Annual
Colloquium on Research in Economic Psychology, Turku, Finland, 161-167.
[11] Henrich, J., R. Boyd, S. Bowles, C. Camerer, E. Fehr, H. Gintis, and R.
McElreath (2001): In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments
in 15 Small-Scale Societies, American Economic Review 91(2), 73-78.
[12] Hofstede, G. (2001): Cultures Consequences, Comparing values, behaviors,
institutions and organizations across nations, 2nd Edition, Sage Publica-
tions, Thousand Oaks.
[13] Oosterbeek, H., R. Sloof and G. van de Kuilen (2004): Cultural diﬀerences
in ultimatum game experiments, Experimental Economics, 7(2), 171-188.
10[14] Roth, A. E., V. Prasnikar, M. Okuno-Fujiwara, and S. Zamir (1991): Bar-
gaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and
Tokyo An experimental study, American Economic Review 81(5), 1068-
1095.
[15] Selten, R. (1967): Die Strategiemethode zur Erforschung des eingeschr¨ ankt
rationalen Verhaltens im Rahmen eines Oligopolexperimentes, in H. Sauer-
mann (Ed.): Beitr¨ age zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung, J.C.B.
Mohr (Paul Siebeck), T¨ ubingen, 136-168.
[16] Walkowitz, G. (2005): Trust and Reciprocity in Transnational Interactions
- An Inter-Cultural Experimental Game with Germans, Argentineans and
Chinese, University of Bonn, mimeo.
[17] Willinger, M., C. Keser, C. Lohmann, and J.-C. Usunier (2003): A compar-
ison of trust and reciprocity between France and Germany Experimental
investigation based on the investment game, Journal of Economic Psychol-
ogy 24(3), 447-466.
5 Appendix









Thank you for participating in our international experiment. Please read the following 
instructions very carefully. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We will then 
answer your question at your desk in private. During the experiment we will not answer any 
of your questions. In case you still have questions, please read these instructions again. 
During the whole experiment it is very important that you do not communicate with any of 
the other participants. We therefore ask you not to talk to each other.   
 
In this experiment you can earn money. Your individual earnings from the experiment depend 
on your own decisions and on the decisions of other participants taken in the experiment. 
Please keep the code number handed out in this experiment carefully. It is necessary to 
receive your payment. Without code number we cannot pay out your earnings. 
 
Right after the experiment, you will receive a fixed fee of 5 $ which is independent from the 
decisions you take in today’s experiment. This fixed fee is paid in addition to the money you 
earned in the experiment. 
 
During the experiment, you are involved into an interaction with randomly assigned other 
participants. These randomly assigned participants take their decisions at a different point in 
time than you do, without having knowledge about your decisions. You are not told who this 
other participant is, neither during the experiment nor in any point in time after the 
experiment. The persons who today participate with you in the experiment are not assigned to 
you. 
 
After this introduction we will ask you some questions to check your understanding of the 
experimental rules. Then the experiment itself will start. After the experiment, we will ask 
you to fill in a questionnaire which we need for a statistical analysis of the experimental data.   II
2. The general design of the experiment 
 
The experiment consists of two parts A and B, each divided in three similar decision rounds. 
During one part, pairs of two participants are formed who interact throughout the whole part. 
At the beginning of the first part it is randomly determined which person you are in this part. 
You can either be person A – and start with part A – or person B - and start with part B. There 
is the same number of A-persons and B-persons in the experiment. Within the three decision 
rounds in each part, each participant takes decisions keeping the same role, either as person A 
or as person B. The protocol for the second part is identical to the first part. However, in this 
part you are the opposite person – if you were person A in the first part you are now person B, 
and vice versa. You will not interact with a person that is sitting with you in this room now. 
During the whole experiment, each person interacts with an assigned other person only once.  
 
The procedure for one round is as follows:  
 
At the beginning of each round, each person A receives an initial endowment X of 10 ECU 
(ECU=Experimental Currency Unit). Person B receives no endowment. The exchange rate 
from ECU to $ is 5 ECU = 1 $.  
 
Person A can now choose to either send an integer part,  all or nothing of his initial 
endowment X to a randomly matched person B. This means, he can choose any integer a from 
the interval [0,10] of his initial endowment he wants to send to person B. Each amount a 
chosen by person A is doubled. Thus, person B does not receive the amount a originally sent 
by person A but she receives two times as much, i.e. 2a. 
  
Here is an example: If person A sends 4 ECU, person B receives 8 ECU. If person A 
sends 6 ECU, person B receives 12 ECU. 
 
During the experiment, person B is not told which amount a person A actually chose. 
Therefore, person B does not know how large 2a actually is. Person B now has to decide how 
much she wants to transfer back to person A. Since person B does not know the actual amount 
a or 2a respectively having been sent by person A she has to decide for each possible value of 
the doubled amount 2a how much she wants to transfer back to person A. The amount person 
B transfers back to person A is b. Person B can decide whether she wants to transfer back an 
integer part, all or nothing of 2a to person A. The amount b transferred back is not multiplied. 
Person A receives no information about person B’s actual decisions during the experiment. 
 
Person B’s decision table for one round looks as follows: 
 
Person A sent you a: You  receive  2a: Which  amount  b do you want to transfer back? 
0 0   
1 2   
2 4   
3 6   
4 8   
5 10   
6 12   
7 14   
8 16   
9 18   
10 20     III
   
After B’s decision on b, the first decision round has finished for both persons. The general 
procedure of the following second and third decision round corresponds to the procedure of 
the first decision round.  
 
Actual payments of the experimental earnings of person A and person B are made after 
having finished all experimental sessions. By assigning person A’s actual decision a to person 
B’s decision b being valid for person A’s actual decision a, individual payment for each round 
can be calculated.  
 
Person A’s individual profit GA for one round is: 
 
Initial endowment X 
- amount a sent 
+ amount b transferred back by person B 
= GA, Person A’s individual profit for one round  
 
 
Person B’s individual profit GB for one round is: 
 
Doubled amount a, sent by person A 
- amount b transferred back by person B to person A 
= GB, Person B’s individual profit for one round  
 
 
Example: Person A decides to send 4 ECU to person B in one round. Then, person B 
receives 8 ECU. Person B decides to transfer 5 ECU back. 
 
Person A’s individual profit GA of is: 
 
 
Initial endowment X 10  ECU 
- amount a sent  - 4 ECU 
+ amount b transferred back by person B  + 5 ECU 
= GA, Person A’s individual profit for one round   = 11 ECU 
 
 
Person B’s individual profit GB is: 
 
Doubled amount a, sent by person A  8 ECU 
- amount b transferred back by person B to person A  - 5 ECU 
= GB, Person B’s individual profit for one round   = 3 ECU 
 
The individual total experimental payoff for each participant is calculated by the sum of the 
payoffs in all six rounds plus the show up fee of 5 $ paid today.   IV
3. The detailed experimental procedure  
 
In the following, we precisely explain how the experiment proceeds and which consecutive 
decisions you have to take.  
 
After having read this instruction very carefully, we will answer your questions in private. 
Please raise your hand if you have questions. Before the experiment starts, we again will ask 
all participants whether they fully understood the instructions of the experiment. 
 
We then will give you a short exercise to check your understanding of the experimental rules. 
After having solved these quizzes, the experiment will start. 
 
 
Start of the experiment 
 
At the beginning, each participant randomly draws a first decision sheet. This decision sheet 
contains your personal code number. Please keep this code number very carefully. You will 
need this code number for being paid your experimental earnings. Furthermore, it guarantees 
full anonymity and confidentiality. By using this procedure, we are not able to assign answers 








  You are told that you are person A 
 
  Person A is paid an initial endowment of X=10 ECU by the experimenters. At this 
moment, person A owns this amount and can dispose of it. 
 
  Now person A is told that a person B was randomly assigned to him by the experimenters. 
Person A learns the family name, the name of the university and the country where the 
assigned person B is studying. With this participant, person A is interacting during this 
round.          
 
  Person A now decides which amount a he actually wants to sent to the randomly assigned 
participant B. He can chose any integer from the interval [0,10]. 
 





The procedure of this decision round for person A is identical to the procedure of round 1. 
However, in this round a different interacting person B is randomly assigned to person A. This 
means that in this second round person A does not interact with the same person B from round 
1.  
 





The procedure of decision round 3 for person A is identical to the procedure of the previous 
rounds 1 and 2. However, again a different interacting person is randomly assigned to person 
A. This means that in this third round, person A does not interact with one of the persons B in 
rounds 1 or 2. During the whole experiment, each person interacts with an assigned person B 
only once.  
 
This part has now finished.  
 
 




  You are told that you are person B 
 
  Now person B is told that a person A was randomly assigned to her by the experimenters. 
Person B learns the family name, the name of the university and the country where the 
assigned person A is studying. With this participant, person B is interacting during this 
round. 
 
  For each possible value of 2a, person B is now asked which amount she wants to transfer 
back to person A. Person B now indicates an integer for all 11 possible amounts of 2a 
concerning the amount b person B wants to transfer back to person A.  
 





The procedure of this decision round for person B is identical to the procedure of round 1. 
However, in this round a different interacting person A is randomly assigned to person B. This 






The procedure of decision round 3 for person B is identical to the procedure of the previous 
rounds 1 and 2. However, again a different interacting person is randomly assigned to person 
B. This means that in this third round, person B does not interact with one of the persons A in 
rounds 1 or 2. During the whole experiment, each person interacts with an assigned person A 
only once. 
 
This part has now finished. 
 
At the end of the experiment we would like you to answer some questions which we need for 
the statistical analysis of our experiment. 